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THE banking system that emerged after the October Revolution
and, more specifically, after the credit reforms of 1930—1932 is
unique in many respects. To be sure, examples of banking institu-
tions combining central banking and commercial banking may be
found in some nonsocialist countries. In the less developed coun-
tries, central banks have frequently assumed a leading role in
implementing development programs by providing the necessary
financial institutions, instruments, and markets. Even in some
leading industrial countries such as France and Italy large com-
mercial banks are owned by the government. The uniqueness of
theSovietbanking systemlies,rather,inthecomplete
integration of monetary processes within the system of central
planning, and in the credit and foreign exchange monopoly of the
State Bank, which has broad powers of control over the perfor-
mance of the entire state-owned segment of the economy.
In historical perspective, the position of the State Bank of the
U.S.S.R. (Gosbank) today may be viewed as the ultimate expres-
sion of a relationship between government and banking that has
its roots in Tsarist Russia. Making active use of official guidance,
support, and stimulation to push the backward country toward
modernization, the Tsarist government was one of the first any-
where to press banking into the service of economic progress. A
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brief look at the past, therefore, may be useful in throwing light on
this development.
The State and Banking Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution
Several aspects of the banking arrangements after War Commu-
nism actually had close antecedents in the institutions of Tsarist
Russia. Prior to 1917, government initiative frequently substituted
for private initiative when it came to achieving specific objectives
of economic policy and creating the financial institutions required
to stimulate capital formation and economic growth.' Throughout
the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries, the state
provided capital and credit (first through official banks and later
through control of the privately owned banks) for significant
segments of the manufacturing and mining industries, railroads,
and utilities.
All of Europe's central banks, which, except for that of Swe-
den, were privately owned prior to World War I, made important
contributions to the development of their countries' economic
potential through direct lending to the private sector as well as
through discount operations. In numerous cases they facilitated
the financing of factories, railroads, and other facilities built in the
national interest, frequently with a view to their military value.
But only Tsarist Russia's State Bank, which had maintained its
position as the leading source of commercial credit even after
becoming the bank of issue, consistently undertook credit opera-
tions in the interest of economic development and in this connec-
tion frequently took credit risks incompatible with normal busi-
ness practice. It made loans under conditions that, in some cases,
were equivalent to subsidies, and occasionally waived repay-
ment, effectively transforming loans into grants, in order to nurse
through enterprises judged essential from the national stand-
point. It even supplied capital indirectly to industry through loans
collateralized by new securities, and provided part of the initial
capital for some new banks.
The history of Russian banking is a striking example of the
complete dependence of a central bank on the Ministry of
'For Saint-Simonist influence on several ministers of finance, see Normano [136], Ch. 1.
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Finance, and of the use of the banking system (both government
and privately owned) as a tool for implementing official policy. In
no other country prior to World War I was the central bank so
clearly a tool of government, so openly controlled by the Ministry
of Finance,2 and so heavily involved in private credit operations
designed to stimulate industrial development and to serve the
national interest.
The history of banking in Russia prior to the revolution of 1917
unfolds as a succession of government efforts to provide the
country with a minimum of modern banking facilities—originally,
to carry on trade with foreign countries; later, to support the
landed gentry, the backbone of the nation's social and political
structure; and ultimately, to develop a modern industry and the
requisite network of railroads and other transportation and com-
munication facilities.
The first part of Russian banking history, covering more than
two centuries before the establishment of the first privately
owned commercial bank in 1866, can be written in terms of the
vicissitudes of not more than a dozen state-owned institutions.3
These were operated by state officials (or former officials), pursu-
ing objectives defined by the Ministry of Finance (or its predeces-
sors), directed by the department of Credit Administration within
the Ministry, and supervised by a high-level board whose mem-
bers normally included officials of ministerial rank and, at times,
close relatives of the Tsar.
Credit institutions other than commercial banks originating
before the 1860's were also sponsored either by the central gov-
ernment (widows' and orphans' provident banks, for example,
which antedated the first state commercial banks and later evolved
into savings bank-type institutions), or by provincial and local
21n prerevolutionary Russia, the Ministry of Finance was in full charge of maintaining
the external value of the ruble and the country's foreign credit. By active intervention in
foreign exchange markets, it succeeded in maintaining a strong foreign exchange position
for the ruble. In particular, it used part of the proceeds of its heavy foreign borrowings to
build up large official holdings of gold, a significant part of which was held abroad. These
holdings were used, when necessary, to buy up notes, trade bills, and other ruble claims
clandestinely in order to maintain the strength ofthe ruble in foreign exchange markets.
Tsarist Russia also engaged in secret support operations on European stock exchanges
where shares of Russian corporations and Russian bonds (government, government-
guaranteed, and private) were traded.
3For a more detailed discussion, see Garvy [233] and Gindin [321, [331 and [34]. See
also Borovoy [17].16 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System
governments (noblemen's land banks and savings banks, respec-
tively) as part of a program formulated by the central government.
From the beginning, credit from these government supported
financial institutions played a crucial role in investment funding,
given the scarcity of alternative sources of funds for opening
mines or starting the first industries. Some of these institutions
were patterned after foreign models (the discount offices, for
example), while others, such as the "copper banks" designed to
monetize copper (see footnote 3), grew out of conditions peculiar
to the empire of the Tsars.
Since one's standing at court was frequently a more important
factor in obtaining loans than either the creditworthiness of the
borrowing firm or the prospective profitability of the projects to
be financed, many government banks soon found their assets
frozen. In some instances, existing institutions had to be liqui-
dated, only to be replaced by others with similar purposes and
sources of funds. This situation was characteristic of the period
before 1861, when banking resources consisted almost exclu-
sively of initial capital received from the State Treasury and
replenished by it at various intervals in subsequent years. The
fragmentary statistical data available for that period suggest that,
despite administrative ingenuity in creating a variety of distinct
credit institutions, the banks' total resources derived from both
budgetary appropriations and deposits were relatively small.
Modern banking came to Russia at the time of the liberation of
the serfs in 1861, just a few years earlier than the creation of the
national banking system in the United States. The restructuring of
the Russian banking system followed the financial crisis of 1857—
1859 and resulted in the liquidation of practically all state credit
and savings institutions. Commercial banking, which developed
rapidly in the last fifty years before the 1917 revolution, was to a
considerable extent subject to official tutelage, even though for-
eign participation in private banking capital was significant. It was
highly centralized; in the last few decades preceding the revolu-
tion, fewer banks were in operation than in either the United
Kingdom or Germany. On the eve of World War I, twelve institu-
tions accounted for 79 percent of the assets of all commercial
banks. P. P. Migulin, the author of one of the few existing
monographs on the history of Russian banking prior to 1917,
r
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concluded that "from the very beginning in this field we had no
private initiative, and the government was forced to assume it."
His prescription for the reorganization of the Russian banking
system included important elements of the Soviet credit system as
it existed prior to the abolition of the specialized banks, as well as
the creation of central agricultural, industrial, and mortgage banks
under joint state-private ownership. He envisaged survival of
privately and mutually owned commercial banks only if they were
subject to strict government control.4 However, official banks
continued to play an important role, acting as conduits for direct
and indirect government subsidies.5
After about 1875, the big banks which began as deposit and
discount banks became mixed banks ("banques d'affaires") by
engaging in securities underwriting. They held a relatively large
part of their assets in equity securities, many of which were
issued by government-sponsored or government-favored corpora-
tions, or by firms heavily dependent on government orders.
Banks became increasingly aggressive, and for the largest among
them underwriting and investment activities became very impor-
tant. They provided entrepreneurship to industry, but were often
misused by promoters and speculators.
Mixed banking played a considerable role in the industrial
upsurge of the 1890's. The banks controlled a significant number
of businesses, including many of the largest firms with the most
advanced technology, and actively promoted mergers and
monopolies.6 A. Gerschenkron's thesis that, in the last decade of
the nineteenth century, the mixed banking system of Russia was
able to assume a leading role in the process of industrialization, is
a familiar one.
A third period of Russian banking opened with the resumption
of rapid growth after the depressing effects of the Russo-Japanese
War were overcome. Mixed banks became a key element in the
process of industrialization in their role as channelers of private
capital into the new and more dynamic branches of industry and
as vehicles for government subsidies and other forms of official
4See [62), pp. 437—439.
5The savings bank system was operated by the government through the State Bank. It
was quite extensive (8,553 offices in 1914), but highly centralized.
6See Gindin [32], and Crisp, in [105].18 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System
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support. Their activities in the decade preceding World War I
were of a nature to support the view, widely held among Western
European (particularly German)socialists,that banks had
become the masters of industry. This view, as we shall see in the
following section, became the basis of Lenin's characterization of
the banking system as the "ready-made tool" for establishing a
socialist economy and for administrating it.7
The state remained an important source of financing for indus-
trial entrepreneurs through the intermediation of the State Bank,
where budgetary surpluses were accumulated, while foreign loans
to industrial corporations and railroads were supported by state
guarantees. A foreign observer concluded that the St. Petersburg
banks were "Russian in appearance, foreign with regard to their
resources, and ministerial as to risk bearing."8
On the whole, the financial structure of Russia remained under-
developed until the Revolution. As a result of the country's
economic and social backwardness, commercial banking offices
and financial institutions other than banks were concentrated in
the larger cities, and financial markets and instruments were
limited.
Toward the Concept of a Monobank
The idea that the banking system could make an important contri-
bution to the economic transformation of Russia can be traced to
the writings of Russian statesmen and economists, some of whom
were ardent slavophiles, going back to more than a century before
the revolution of The first illegal Marxist group was yet to
be formed when, before the turn of the century, some writers
already advocated economic development via the state; a fiat
currency managed by the state with the goals of domestic price
stability; isolation of the ruble's international value from market
forces; and a credit system that would help industrialize Russia
under state guidance.
During the controversy surrounding the introduction of the gold
7See Garvy[232].
8Aghad [97],pp.136—137.
9For details,see Garvy [233].
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althoughtheir invention isgestandard in 1897, views were expressed in favor of a banking and
credit system very similar to the one that emerged following the
Bolshevik Revolution and which assumed its present form with the
credit reforms of 1930—1932. For instance, S. Sharapov, one of
the leading opponents of the gold standard, advocated the use of
"absolute money," completely divorced from precious metals
and merely a conventional unit of account. He claimed that, in the
last analysis, the domestic value of money depended on the faith
of the population in the strength of its autocratic government. To
support his view, Sharapov referred to long periods of Russian
history when fiat money, such as leather money or paper assi-
gnats,1° had been widely used. Sharapov held that "a country
capable of an autarkic development, such as Russia, can achieve
through the use of absolute money tremendous economic devel-
opment, without depriving anybody of his livelihood and without
risking any economic crises." He believed that the only meaning-
ful limit to the expansion of credit was full employment, and that
the only rational means of putting finance in the service of eco-
nomic development was the creation of a "universal bank." Its
operations in issuing credit and controlling the money supply
would be governed by the needs of the economy and would not be
restricted by any "prejudices" and irrelevant limitations, such as
the size of the reserves of precious metals. Sharapov favored an
expansion of credit and a fiduciary issue of paper money to the
point where all productive resources of the society would be fully
utilized.
In advocating creation of a universal bank, Sharapov antici-
pated the monobank. His plan provided for the merging of the
State Bank into a "Great Treasury" which would absorb the
network of local Treasury offices and perform all fiscal functions
in close cooperation with the State Treasury, which would con-
tinue to function as an agency of the Ministry of Finance.. The
"Great Treasury" would,ineffect,have avirtualcredit
monopoly.
Sharapov favored a stable domestic price level and varying the
external value of domestic paper currency in relation to gold. In
order to avoid business fluctuations, the State Bank should regu-
'°Paper assignats were issued in Russia a decade before the French Revolution,
although their invention is generally credited to the later event.
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late the quantity of money independently of the amount of gold
and foreign exchange reserves. To facilitate regulating the exter-
nal value of the ruble, he logically advocated a state monopoly for
allforeign exchangetransactions."The very question of
[managing of exchange rates by an agency of the state] is being
raised here for the first time, and it is quite impossible to say how
soon the Russian state will accomplish this task." We know the
answer now: it took less than a generation. Incidentally, Shara-
pov preferred, as Soviet planners do, using historical average
prices rather than current market prices as a guide to foreign trade
policy.1'
Lenin's Views on the Role of Banking
There is no evidence to indicate that Lenin's views on the role of
the banking system in the period of transition to a socialist
economy, formed in the years immediately preceding the revolu-
tion of 1917, were influenced by the banking and monetary
reforms advocated by Sharapov and other contemporary writ-
ers.12 Nevertheless, Lenin envisioned a single state bank, sup-
ported by a state foreign exchange monopoly, as the "skeleton of
a socialist society"3 and the core of a socialist administrative
apparatus controlling the economy.
All of the elements of Lenin's much-quoted passage on the role
of banks in building socialism (see page 21) can be traced to the
beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century, to Saint-
Simon and Marx. But it is likely that his advocacy in 1917 of using
the banking system as a tool for the socialist transformation of
society was more directly related to the discussion in the pre-
World War I social-democratic literature concerning the role of
banks in forging powerful industrial combines and their control
over industry. Lenin's specific prescription for using banks as an
administrative as well as an economic tool was derived from the
contemporary theories of some radical and socialist writers of
"[73], p. 88. For an interesting discussion of monetary theory in prerevolutionary
Russia, see Vlasenko [90].
'2For a fuller discussion, see Garvy [233].
'3See footnote 15 below.
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Western Europe, including Hobson (1902), Helphand, better
known as "Parvus" (1910), and Hilferding (1910), with whose
works he became familiar during his long years of exile. He used
their analyses of the role of banks in advanced industrial coun-
tries, expanded by studies of more recent developments, in his
book on imperialism, and made the concepts of "financial capi-
tal," "monopoly capitalism," and "economic imperialism" his
own. Thus, in 1907 he wrote:
Scattered capitalists are transformed into a single collective capitalist.
When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, the banks, as
it were, a purely technical and exclusively auxiliary opera-
tion. When, however, these operations grow to enormous dimensions
we find that a handful of monopolists control all the operations, both
commercial and industrial, of capitalist society. They can, by means
of their banking connections, by running current accounts and trans-
acting other financial operations, first ascertain exactly the position of
the various capitalists, then control them, influence them by restrict-
ing or enlarging, facilitating or hindering their credits, and finally they
can entirely determine their fate, determine their income, deprive
them of capital, or, on the other hand, permit them to increase their
capital rapidly and to enormous proportions, etc. [Italics in the origi-
nal.]14
Lenin advocated the creation of a single government bank as a
means of assuring control over industry, but also because he
believed that a nationalized banking system could be easily
reshaped into the core of the socialist state's administrative appa-
ratus. In a passage much quoted by Soviet authors, he wrote a
few days before the October Revolution:
Without big banks, socialism would be impossible. The big banks are
the "state apparatus" which we need to bring about socialism, and
which we take ready-made from capitalism.... Asingle State Bank,
the biggest of the big, with branches in every rural district, in every
factory, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist appara-
tus. There will be country-wide bookkeeping, country-wide account-
ing of the production and distribution of goods; this will be, so to
speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of socialist society.
[Italics in the original.]'5
'4See "Imperialism," Petrograd, 1917, in [129].
'5See [129], vol. 26, p. 106.22 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System Soviet Bankir
An identical view was expressed by Lenin after the October
Revolution. "Banking policy must not stop with the nationaliza-
tion of banks, but must work slowly but decisively toward the
transformation of banks into a single accounting apparatus for the
regulation of the organized socialist economic life of the country
as a whole."16
Lenin's notion of the role of banks in building socialism and in
directing the economy during the transitional period hardly goes
beyond the theme developed by Saint-Simon, Marx, Hobson,
Hilferding, and Parvus. Interestingly enough, all discussed the
potential use of the commercial banking system, rather than of the
central bank, in building socialism. Similarly, Lenin noted that the
control which commercial banks had achieved over individual
industrial firms resulted in concentration of production in large
operating units. He ascribed the banks' ability to exercise this
control largely to industry's dependence on them for obtaining
additional equity capital as well as credit. Lenin saw their poten-
tial for central control and direction of dispersed industries in a
country where regional and local units of the government's
administrative apparatus were inadequate to deal with economic
problems. He was impressed with the technical functions per-
formed by the extensive branch networks dominating the scene in
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and indeed, Russia itself,
rather than with the possibility of using monetary and credit
policy as a tool for restructuring the economy and achieving
adequate growth and stability.
As events turned out after the Bolshevik seizure of power, the
monetary and banking system disintegrated under the impact of
the civil war and the accompanying inflation. A state bank as
envisaged by Lenin, complete with credit monopoly and complex
control functions, did not materialize until almost fifteen years
later, with the first Five-Year Plan well under way. When it did,
the heritage from another epoch was unmistakable—an epoch
when enlightened bureaucrats under an authoritarian regime had
tried to use state-directed credit and Treasury resources to lift
129], vol. 36, P. 220.
Lenin anticipated the development of comprehensive flow-of-funds accounts (still not
developed in the Soviet Union tQday) when he wrote: "... oncethe banks are national-
ized it will be possible to achieve a state of affairs when the government knows from where
and when millions and billions of ruble payments flow." (Ibid., vol. 34, p. 163.)
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Russia from centuries of economic backwardness. Sharapov
would have easily recognized his "universal bank."
Soviet Banking Before the Credit Reforms of 1930—1932
On the first day of the Bolshevik coup, October 25, 1917 (old
calendar), an armed detachment of workers and soldiers, under
direct orders from Lenin, occupied the main office of the State
Bank in Petrograd. The Bolsheviks were determined not to repeat
the mistakes of the Paris Commune, which had respected the
Banque de France and left its gold stock and supply of unissued
notes inviolate. (At that time, the privately owned Banque de
France functioned also as a bank of issue.) The Bolsheviks
encountered resistance and sabotage, not only from State Bank
officials but also from employees who refused to cooperate with
the new officials appointed by Lenin's government.
On the day following the Bolshevik seizure of power all com-
mercial banks closed down.'7 Their staffs received salaries for
three months in advance, with the understanding that they would
abstain from performing their duties as long as a Soviet govern-
ment was in power, joining the concerted action of the employees
of the State Bank and all other government financial institutions
and ministries in refusing to serve the new regime. This boycott
was fully effective. The few operations that commercial banks did
undertake in the weeks following the October Revolution were
directed solely toward protecting their assets while contributing
to the general paralysis of economic life that, Lenin's opponents
hoped, would bring down the new regime.
The new authorities were slow in making full use of the central
bank. This was due partly to their lack of knowledge and experi-
ence, and partly to the fact that their immediate objective was
merely to obtain currency from its vaults to meet the most
'70nthe seizure of banks and the ensuingdifficulties, seeGindin [31], Atlas [6] and the
articles by Azarch,Atlas. and Solovei in D. K.March and August 1967. The standard
sourcein English on the nationalization of banks and the first years of Soviet banking and
fiscal policy is Arnold [100], but the detailed and illuminating account of Carr [1071, vol. 1,
Ch. 8, and vol. 2, sections (e) in chapters 16. 17, and 18 is superior. For a detailed account of
the nationalization by the former vice president of the Central Committee of Russian
Banks, see Epstein [114]. A comprehensive description of Soviet banking in the early fifties
may be found in Grossman's chapter in [1021.
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pressing needs. Manifestly, the effective boycott by the bulk of
bank employees made the use of the banking system as "the
skeleton of socialist society" a practical impossibility.'8 How-
ever, during the months that followed, the total disorganization of
all banking operations was gradually overcome and by the end of
1917 the cash department of the State Bank was functioning again
and some discount and lending operations were taking place. In
the middle of December 1917, the State Bank, as an agency of the
new political power structure, was given control over commercial
banks, simultaneously with the establishment of "workers' and
peasants' control" over all private firms, the precise scope of
which was to be determined later by agreements with individual
banking institutions.
Within a few weeks, however, armed detachments led by
representatives of the Bolshevik-controlled local Soviet occupied
the head offices of the commercial banks in Petrograd. On
December 27, 1917 (supplemented by a decree issued on January
26, 1918), the Soviet government nationalized all commercial
banks without compensation of domestic or foreign stockholders
by canceling all their shares. The commercial banks were merged
into the State Bank, whose name was changed to People's Bank
(Norodny Bank) of the Russian Socialist Republic. The nationali-
zation of mortgage banks had preceded that of commercial banks.
This earlier act was the logical consequence of the nationalization
of all land, with mortgaging of land declared illegal.
The central bank of cooperatives, the Moscow Narodny Bank,
was originally spared from the wholesale nationalization of banks.
Organized in 1912 by the cooperative movement, which by that
time had attained considerable importance, it had thousands of
farm cooperatives as shareowners. For this reason, even though
the bank as well as the cooperative movement were controlled by
socialist parties other than the Bolsheviks, Lenin delayed nation-
alization for over a year, seeking a compromise. Only when the
government failed to achieve control through suasion was the
bank nationalized and merged with the People's Bank, the prede-
"Writing aboutthisperiod, Z. Atlas, dean of the Soviet historians of banking and credit,
commented: 'However, the credit and monetary system of Russia, which was in a state of
complete disorganization, could not fulfill the role of a powerful fulcrum during the time of
transition from capitalism to socialism as predicted by Marx." [1651. p. II.
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cessorof the State Bank. At the same time farm credit coopera-
tives were placed under government control.'9
In 1918, following unification of all public budgets into a single
national ("unified") budget, the People's Bank became the sole
depository of government funds and was put in charge of all fiscal
operations. Deposit transfers, through advice, draft, or check,
became obligatory for the socialized and cooperative sectors of
the economy. These two measures laid the foundations for the
subsequent separation of payments circuits discussed in Chapter
5. Thus, some of the basic features of the present credit system
emerged within a year of the October Revolution.
Soviet monetary and banking experience between the October
Revolution and the credit reforms of 1930—1932 may be divided
into the two periods 1917 to 1924 and 1924 to 1932. The first
period saw the rapid disintegration of the old monetary and
banking system and the subsequent long but successful struggle to
introduce a stable Soviet currency. These years were character-
ized by unprecedented hyper-inflation fueled not only by a flood
of currency issued by the Treasury but also by the chaotic state of
public finances, the breakdown of the economy, the virtual cessa-
tion of foreign trade, and the fragmentation of the country as a
result of the civil war. Much of the trade, particularly between
farmers and the urban population, took place on a barter basis.
Business transactions were typically based on valuation other
than the face value of the circulating medium. Considerable quan-
tities of goods were requisitioned by the armies and other military
groups fighting in the civil war and by the related civilian authori-
ties (or paid for in currency issued by them, or in old Tsarist
rubles). At the end of the period (1924), industrial production was
still less than half, and agricultural output, not much more than
two-thirds, of the prewar (1913) level.
Various types of direct controls were applied to cope with the
pervasive scarcities that arose with the destruction of the market
mechanism during the civil war and the superinflation that
deprived money of all its standard functions. During the period
known as War Communism, an overall scarcity of consumer
goods led to demonetization of the economy, and financial rela-
t9See Fein [175].26 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System Soviet Banki
tions with foreign countries ceased. The subsequent reintegration
of the national territory required central direction in setting priori-
ties and in allocating material resources under conditions of over-
all scarcities and a chronic shortage of foreign exchange.
Lenin's earlier view that banks should become the backbone of
thesocialist administration underwent a number of drastic
changes not unrelated to the gradual disintegration of the econ-
omy. The focus of what consituted top priority for building social-
ism shifted from a centralized system of accounting and control—
which the single bank could have easily provided—to the com-
plex problem of rebuilding the Russian economy on the principles
of directive planning.2° The Supreme Council of the National
Economy, the trade unions, and the soviets were successively
identified as the carriers of economic transformation responsible
for assuring that the decisions reached at the center of govern-
ment be implemented throughout the whole country, down to the
remotest corner. This reversal in policy was complete at the time
of the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921.
By this time, a unified monetary system had ceased to exist and
the country was in the grip of a wild inflation.2'
In January of 1920—against a background of civil war, with the
area controlled by the central government considerably reduced
and transportation and communications almost completely dis-
rupted—the People's (Narodny) Bank, the only banking institu-
tion still in existence, was liquidated. Its main functions were
transferred to a department of the People's Commissariat (Minis-
try) of Finance. The economic collapse caused by the civil war
was only partly responsible for the demise of the People's Bank.
Equally important was the belief in the imminence of a socialist
society, reflecting the influence of the extreme left both inside and
outside the Communist Party. The People's Commissar
Finance, C. S. Sokolnikov, was quoted as saying that "finance
should not exist in a socialist community."22 Indeed, Marx him-
201n 1921, Lenin remarked: "Quite a lot was written about the State Bank at the end.
of 1917 but ...itall remained largely a dead letter." [129], vol. 33. p. 91.
21Chachulin [21] lists 2,181 different local and regional issues of money surrogates that
were circulating in the Soviet Union at one time or another.
22Kat.zenellenbaum [126], p. 98. On the intellectual origins of a moneyless command
economy, see Wiles [254], particularly pp. 12ff. "In 1928 [at the start of the first Five-Year
Plan] they returned to centralized command, retaining, however, money within the com-
mand sector, in a passive accounting role" (p. 16).
self seems to hay
with money (litt.
vouchers or toke:
performed were
obtain consumpt:
a new economy
not function with
A return to m(
signaled by the c
the Russian Soci
Finance. By th
operations in5
branches rapidly
The monetary
this period
Treasury Notes
increased by 11
and by 50 to 70
1922, the high pc
of early 1924 tF
system began w
rency in Octobe
precious metals.
until the old curr
the previous pn
ments to a vari
"commodity rul
The gold-back
the Soviet state
its real purchasit
currency reform
23See Arnold [100],
24Equiva!ent to 10
rubles.
The similarity of thi
1897 was noted by Yur
However great the ec
passed since 1914, hov
with the past, element
during the recent year
ago by Witte's reformSystem
quent reintegration
on in setting priori-
conditions of over-
exchange.
ne the backbone of
Lumber of drastic
ration of the econ-
for building social-
and control—
:ided—to the corn-
ty on the principles
of the National
were successively
ination responsible
center of govern-
untry, down to the
)mplete at the time
icy (NEP) in 1921.
teased to exist and
civil war, with the
isiderably reduced
st completely dis-
ly banking institu-
tin functions were
mmissariat (Minis-
d by the civil war
he People's Bank.
ence of a socialist
eft both inside and
's Commissar of
ying that "finance
ndeed, Marx him-
StateBankat the end.
•33, p. 91.
of money Surrogates that
if a moneyless command
itartofthe first Five-Year
money within the corn-
Soviet Banking Before the Credit Reforms of 1930 —1 93227
self seems to have believed that a socialist society could dispense
with money (little, if anything was said about credit), and that
vouchers or tokens evidencing the amount of socially useful labor
performed were all that the toiling population would require to
obtain consumption goods. However, it soon became evident that
a new economy could not be built and that the government could
not function without a stable monetary unit and credit system.
A return to more conventional banking and credit practices was
signaled by the creation, in October 1921, of a new State Bank of
the Russian Socialist Republic, placed under the Commissariat of
Finance. By the end of the year, the State Bank had begun
operations in several of the main cities and its network of
branches rapidly expanded in the following years.
The monetary policy that gradually emerged toward the end of
this period aimed at creating a stable currency to replace the
Treasury Notes (Sovznak—Soviet tokens). Issue of the latter
increased by 11 to 15 percent per month in the first half of 1921
and by 50 to 70 percent a month in the corresponding period of
1922, the high point of the hyperinflation.23 The monetary reform
of early 1924 that resulted in the creation of a new currency
system began with the introduction of the new chervonets cur-
rency in October 1922, with a statutory cover of 28 percent in
precious metals.24 For a time it produced a "bi-paper standard"
until the old currency was completely retired. The complexities of
the previous practice of linking business and some other pay-
ments to a variety of indexes and the wide use of a computed
"commodity ruble" were only gradually overcome.
The gold-backed currency ultimately became the new money of
the Soviet state when the currency reform was completed. While
its real purchasing power declined in subsequent years, no further
currency reforms were undertaken until the end of World War II.
23See Arnold [100],Table19, pp. 128—129.
24Equivalent to 10 rubIes; these were subsequently replaced by notes denominated in
rubles.
The similarity of this reform with that of A. Witte which introduced the gold standard in
1897 was noted by Yurovskiy who was closely associated with the currency reform of 1924:
"1-lowever great the economic upheavals through which Russia and the Soviet Union have
passed since 1914, however radical the revolutionary measures which have severed the link
with the past, elements of the past continue to exist in the present, and the laws passed
during the recent years are in some part related to the monetary system created decades
ago by Witte's reforms." [92], p. 9. See also Atlas [166].28 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System Soviet Bank
The monetary reform of 1924 was accomplished by an effort to
balance the unified budget (for the fiscal year 1924—1925); it made
possible the reestablishment of a banking and credit system.
While the monetary reform terminated hyperinflation by the
introduction of a "stable ruble,"it did not remove the basic
causes of inflationary pressures. Prices remained, however, fairly
stable between 1924 and 1928, even though currency in circula-
tion almost tripled; the improvement in the availability of con-
sumer goods was apparently great enough to offset this increase.
But between October 1, 1928 and June 1. 1932, the volume of
currency in circulation almost tripled again, and consumer prices
rose sharply.25 Inflationary forces received renewed impetus from
the drive toward forced industrialization, shortages in consumer
goods production, and excessive issuance of credit. Rationing of
food, introduced in 1928 for the urban population, was made more
comprehensive in 1931; it was not abolished until 1936.
The share of private stores in total retail trade, which at the
time of the monetary reform still exceeded that of State and
cooperative stores combined (57.7 percent in 1923— 1924), de-
clined, but was still 5.6 percent in1930.26 For a variety of
reasons, the official retail price index became less and less repre-
sentative and, indeed, its publication was discontinued at the
beginning of 1931, not to be resumed until 1956.27
The creation of a stable gold-backed parallel currency in 1922
permitted the organization, in the same year, of the first state
commercial bank for granting long-term investment loans as well
as short-term credit—the Russian Trade and Industrial Bank,
known as Prombank. A new bank t'o service consumer coopera-
tives had been created already at the end of 1921 (the Pokobank)
which was later (November 1922) enlarged (under the name of
Vsekobank) to serve all types of cooperative organizations,
including farm cooperatives.
1922 also saw the introduction of a free market for consumer
25R.Powell, "Recent Developments in Soviet Monetary Policy"in [l22j
26Malafeev[57],table on p. 134.
27Numerousprice indexes were constructed by various Western scholars, not so much
because of the demonstrated defects of Soviet indexes but because few, if any, price
indexes were published in the Soviet Union for a long period. After their publication was
resumed, Chapman wrote: "I would not hesitate to rely more heavily on the Soviet than on
my own retail price index numbers for purposes of comparing the postwar years with
1940." [108], p. 159.
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goods and services under the New Economic Policy (NEP). It
demonstrated that financial incentives could increase output, but
also signaled potential political dangers to the regime. Related
developments in the financial field involved an attempt to rein-
troduce a multichannel system for the extension of credit while
maintaining a tight overall control by the resuscitated State Bank.
During the NEP period, L. Kamenev, at that time head of the
government (Council of People's Commissars), assigned to credit
the role that Lenin had hoped banks would play in the transition
period. He described "centralized credit" as "this commanding
high which we have created practically out of nothing" and as
"the decisive factor in the regulation of the economy, the factor
which [introduces decisive corrections and] is capable both of
causing and preventing crises."28
In 1923, after the creation of the Federation following the end of
the civil war, the State Bank of the Russian Republic was
renamed "State Bank of the USSR" (Gosudarstvennyi Bank,
abbreviated as Gosbank) and became the bank of issue. By 1925,
it had retired almost all other currencies previously in circulation,
including regional and prerevolutionary issues.
During this second period of Soviet monetary experience, from
1924 up to the credit reforms of 1930—1932, a system of special-
ized banks was created. The State Bank, however, was not able
to control their credit activities, and a good deal of competition
between its own lending and that of the other banks developed.
The competing commercial and special-purpose banks were
created by the government in the legal form of joint-stock compa-
nies. A Bank for Foreign Trade and two banks for agriculture
were also organized, and some elements of the prerevolutionary
credit system were revitalized, including the savings bank system,
credit unions, municipal (communal) banks, and various types of
cooperative banks for agriculture, craftsmen, and small entrepre-
neurs. Several additional institutions to provide credit for produc-
ers' and consumers' cooperatives were created during the twen-
ties, but all were liquidated by 1930, at the time of the farm
collectivization drive. No cooperative credit organizations have
survived.
Before it emerged as the single banking institution of the coun-
28P!anovoye Khozyaistvo, January1925. See also Atlas [1651.30 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System
try, the State Bank had begun to perform certain bank functions
vis-á-vis other banks. In particular, it was assigned the role of
controlling credit policies of all other banking institutions. This
control was achieved mainly through administrative means rather
than the monetary policy measures employed by central banks in
nonsocialist countries.
Credit planning became the main instrument of pursuing overall
credit objectives. As early as 1923, the State Bank had begun to
elaborate overall credit plans. The first plan to receive the formal
sanction of the government covered the initial quarter of 1925.
Collection of all government revenue and its disbursement were
transferred to the State Bank in 1925, when thea network of local
offices of the Ministry of Finance was abolished, thus completing
a process initated in 1918. In the same year the accounts of all
local governments were also transferred to the State Bank.
The central role of the State Bank was enhanced by the issu-
ance of new laws in the middle of 1927, which delineated the
activities of various banks and assigned all short-term lending to
the State Bank. Their main purpose was to delineate the type of
short- and long-term credit each banking institution was to extend
(so that an enterprise would not borrow from more than one
bank), and to centralize resources, reporting, and control.
The Credit Reform of 1 930—1 932
Abolition of inter-enterprise credit in 1930 was a final step toward
complete control by the planning authorities over allocation of the
means of production and inventories and toward the reduction of
credit to a purely implementary role. Prohibition of inter-enter-
prise lending left the State Bank as the only source of short-term
credit, except for construction and foreign trade.
The various measures initiated in 1927 laid the groundwork for
a series of sweeping changes which began with a Credit Reform
(decree of January 30, 1930) and was essentially completed by a
reorganization of the State Bank on the basis of a decree issued on
May 25, 1932.29 Also, in 1932, various banks engaged in long-term
financing were reorganized into four such banks with well deline-
29For details, see Arnold [1001.
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The Economic Reform of 1965 31
ated areas of activity and deprived of the remaining responsibili-
ties in the area of short-term credit.
These various changes and the reconstruction of the balance
sheet of the State Bank in 1932 are referred to in the Soviet
Union collectively as the Credit Reform of 1930—1932. Although
these reforms required a significant reorganization of the banking
system to be effective, the structural changes that were made
subsequently dealt mainly with delineating the spheres of activity
of the specialized banks, particularly those which acted as con-
duits for long-term investment funds. Other subsequent changes
were mostly of a procedural and organizational nature. They
involved, among other things, merging the specialized banks for
long-term financing into a single Investment Bank in 1959 and
incorporating the savings bank system into the State Bank in
1961. Otherwise, the banking structure remained unchanged, with
the State Bank (Gosbank) occupying the key position, and the
Investment Bank (Stroibank) and the Bank for Foreign Trade
(Vneshtorgbank) fulifihing specialized, far narrower functions.
Various changes in payments instruments, in the details of the
deposit transfer mechanism, and in credit procedures were also
made after 1932, but the main features of the Soviet banking and
credit system have remained basically unchanged to the present
day. This standard system has been adopted by other "people's
democracies" in Eastern Europe and other areas where commu-
nist regimes have become established since the end of the Second
World War.
a.
The Economic Reform of 1965
The economic reforms initiated in September 1965 by a resolution
adopted by the highest body of the Communist Party (Plenum of
the Central Committee) can be characterized as a half-hearted
attempt to deal with some of the most obvious shortcomings of
the command economy without changing its basic character.3°
30This resolution on measures toimprove the management of industry, to perfect
planning, and to reinforce economic stimulation" was followed by similar resolutions of the
Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on October 4, 1965.
A description of the Reform by leading Soviet economists is available in English in a
variety of sources, including a series of articles which appeared beginning in 1965 in Soviet32 Origins and Evolution of Soviet Banking System
They were conceived as a set of interrelated measures to improve stimulation." It
the performance of the "economic steering mechanism" rather economy by rec
than as a basic revisiOn of the Soviet system of resource alloca- center—withoui
tion and the whole economic organization that implements it. authority to op
From the inception of the Reform, Soviet authorities have tended maximizing uni
to minimize the significance of the departures from the old meth- responsibility fo
ods. Indeed, they have constantly stressed that their purpose is to planner to the
improve planning, not to work toward introducing a socialist excessive numb
market economy—the goal pursued in Yugoslavia and later, in a mere nine succ
more limited way, in Hungary. Still, the 1965 Reform does repre- sales, profits, a
sent the first change of any significance in the management of the position. The p1
Soviet economy since the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in fund, payments
1928. It enlarged the activities of the State Bank by shifting part of investments, ne
long-term financing of industry to credit and by enlarging the use tion of new tech
of credit in capital formation by kolkhozes. Otherwise, it left the planning indica
structure and basic mechanism of the banking and credit system system the gea
as they had evolved as a result of the changes introduced in 1930— specified mainly
1932. ing incentives t
Prior to the government's action, there had been considerable consumer prefei
public discussion by Soviet academicians, administrators, and be produced. N
enterprise managers of ways to improve the operations of the it possible for in
economy. Proposals by Professor Liberman and other economists meeting or exc
in the early sixties regarding the improvement of key mechanisms tional financial
in the Soviet economy had produced an impressive array of profits.
arguments in favor of changes that would open, to a limited Maximization
extent, the centrally directed economy to market forces. ning. It serves, r
The various steps gradually taken since the fall of 1965 were targets of an md
originally presented as a sweeping reform "to improve manage- efficient use of
ment of industry, to perfect planning, and to reinforce economic tion does not r
profitability hay
Soviet Union, e
just one of mar
Life(aSoviet monthly journal published in the United States) including Birman's [218]. .
Thecollection of articles prepared for the J.E.C. [1531 and proceedings of a conference inulcaLors o en
heldinMoscow in June 1965 [851) contain valuable material for the period just return on (inves
prior to the Reform. Various aspects of the Reform are discussed in'Soviet Economic of Reforms" and "A Summary Look at Reforms" in Feiwel [115]; and Borstein and Fusfeld a pe
[104].Part 4 includes important articles on the Reform. See also Campbell [2241, Grossman (rentabel'nost'),
[237], Bratus and loffe, "Legal Aspects of the Economic Reform in the Soviet Union" in introduction of
[113], Seidenstrecher [144], and Schroeder [250], and [251]; see also Garvy [234].
Among the voluminous Soviet literature on the significance of the reform for credit and entire price stru
banking, see Rumyantsev and Banich [71], Bachurin [8] and Dzhavadov [25]. For the
impact on credit of reforms initiated simultaneously in other socialist countries, see Atlas details, see I
[71. References on the early Soviet articles on the Reform, same source, Ch. 6. 111ff.The Economic Reform of 1965 33
stimulation." Its aim was to improve the performance of the
economy by reducing the range of detailed instructions from the
center—without, however, giving the enterprise manager enough
authority to operate the enterprise as an independent, profit-
maximizing unit. To a certain extent, the Reform shifted the
responsibility for short-run profit maximization from the central
planner to the enterprise manager ("director"). It replaced the
excessive number of plan targets to be achieved or surpassed by a
mere nine success ("directive") indicators, among which total
sales, profits, and the profitability ratio occupy a predominant
position. The physical output of the principal product, the wage
fund, payments into the budget, the value of centrally planned
investments, new capacity to be added and goals for the introduc-
tion of new techniques, processes and products are the remaining
planning indicators of the enterprise plan. Under the former
system the gearing of all rewards to the fufflilment of goals
specified mainly or exclusively in physical terms failed in provid-
ing incentives to maximize profits and to recognize adequately
consumer preferences in the determination of the type of goods to
be produced. Narrowing the number of success indicators made
it possible for individual enterprises to concentrate their efforts on
meeting or exceeding these targets in order to qualify for addi-
tional financial rewards, such as retention of a greater share of
profits.
Maximization of profits is not the ultimate goal of Soviet plan-
ning. It serves, rather, as a means of achieving (or exceeding) plan
targets of an individual enterprise with regard to productivity and
efficient use of various inputs. The principle of profit maximiza-
tion does not require, or depend upon, ownership: profit and
profitability have long been central in the economic calculus in the
Soviet Union, even though in economic plans they appeared as
just one of many targets. The Reform introduced as additional
indicators of enterprise performance a set of ratios measuring the
return on (invested and working) capital and profits expressed as
a percentage of total production costs, both called "profitability"
(rentabel'nost'), with several accounting variants used.3' The
introduction of a capital use charge required a revision of the
entire price structure.
31For details,see Korovushkin[49], pp. 81ff., Darkov and Maksmov [231, pp. 9 and
111ff.
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The reasons for the 1965 Reform were numerous and complex, Greater
and stemmed mainly from the performance of the economy itself, reforms via seve:
For years, Western critics, as well as some Soviet economists, to increase the
pointed to various shortcomings in the Soviet economy's perfor- greater efficiency
mance, and in the early sixties there was widespread domestic capital investmei
concern about the key economic indicators showing less progress Finally, maxiri
than during the fifties. However, there is little doubt that the more rational pi
immediate cause of the Reform lay, rather, in the radically resources in pro
changed situation in the consumer goods market. There a rising the
per capita real income in the early sixties faced a consumer goods trade with the do
output that had reached a level high enough to satisfy most basic stopped far shori
consumer demands. After decades of chronic overall shortages, gary and the mor
consumers began to buy discriminatingly and, in some cases, to which were und
withhold purchases, confident that more satisfactory goods would interested in the
ultimately appear on store shelves. For the first time, the con- The basic ch
sumer could choose, reflect, and postpone, at least in the area of untouched by t
certain important periodic purchases, such as clothing and house- production, cent
hold goods. allocation of inpi
The consumers' refusal to buy shoddy or outmoded goods was
• pnceshave cont
one of the immediate influences that precipitated the Reform. By it has remained
postponing their purchases, they caused a piling up of goods in authorities still
retail channels—while savings soared. Reports in the Soviet press the various stat
amply documented this situation, succinctly summarized in an certain intermed
article in a leading literary monthly that made a case for greater products. Contr
reliance on the market mechanism.32 To convert consumer choice details; monetar
into limited feedbacks, the authorities began experimenting in ing fulfillment ol
1962 with a system whereby production would be guided by
actual orders from retail stores rather than by planners' com-
mand. The new system made greater allowance for consumer
choice without giving recognition to consumer sovereignty.
32"The consumer had at his disposal quite a tidy sum of money; on the other hand, an
adecjuate supply of goods was available in retail stores. The problem consisted not in a
general shortage of goods, but in a shortage of goods demanded by consumers. The
consumer began to ask for a greater variety of goods; he was no longer satisfied merely to
have something to put on, he wanted to purchase clothing that was beautiful and stylish.
But industry continued to work on the principle 'take what you are being offered'."
Supporting figures quoted show that at the end of 1965, store inventories of cotton,
wool, and silk textiles amounted to the equivalent of nearly a year's retail sales, an
unusually high ratio. While discussing a similar accumulation of such diverse goods as
clothing items, knit goods, sewing machines, and toys, the author points out that in the
same year the increase in savings deposits almost exactly matched the rise in retail
inventories of all consumer goods other than food. Petrakov [197], p. 173.us and complex,
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Greater emphasis on consumer choice pointed to the need for
reforms via several different avenues. For example, the pressure
to increase the production of consumer goods by achieving
greater efficiency and flexibility in planning and better use of fixed
capital investment was one of them.
Finally, maximization of benefits from foreign trade required a
more rational price system for optimizing the use of domestic
resources in producing for export. Removing distortions required
the restructuring of domestic prices and integration of foreign
trade with the domestic economy. In this area, the Soviet Reform
stopped far short of the fundamental changes introduced in Hun-
gary and the more limited reforms in Poland and Czechoslovakia,
which were undertaken to make the domestic producer directly
interested in the profitability of exports.
The basic characteristics of the Soviet economy were left
untouched by the Reform—state ownership of the means of
production, central planning of economic activity, administrative
allocation of inputs other than labor, and administrative setting of
prices have continued as before. In its all-important state sector,
it has remained a one-seller, one-buyer economy. The planning
authorities still control the relationship between enterprises and
the various state organizations that supply raw materials and
certain intermediate goods and direct the distribution of finished
products. Contracts merely formalize these relationships and set
details; monetary penalties still play a very modest role in enforc-
ing fulfilment of obligations undertaken.
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